Russell attacked these problems by emphasizing that descriptions signify differently than do logically proper names. The epsilon calculus improves upon the predicate calculus by systematically providing complete individual terms. Philosophy 443/543 Fall 2011 . 3 Russell’s theory of (logically proper) names As we’ve already discussed, Russell thought that logically proper names ‘merely and solely’ stand for objects — so he thought that what they contribute to the propositions expressed by sentences in which they occur is the object for which they stand. They are, instead, abbreviations for definite descriptions. In the above passage Russell says If they https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100112600 logically proper) names is misleading, according to the theory. All such sen-tences actually harbor a quantificational structure and express general, rather than singular, propositions. A simple descriptivist theory of names can be thought of as follows: for every proper name p, there is some collection of descriptions D associated with p that constitute the meaning of p. For example, the descriptivist may hold that the proper name Saul Kripke is synonymous with the collection of descriptions such as It might, for instance, And he appears to believe that Recent research has shown that epsilon terms are therefore the "logically proper names" Russell was not able to formalize, but their use improves upon Russell's theory of descriptions not just in that way. 3 Russell’s theory of (logically proper) names As we’ve already discussed, Russell thought that logically proper names ‘merely and solely’ stand for objects — so he thought that what they contribute to the propositions expressed by sentences in which they occur is the object for which they stand. Russell's view concerned "ordinary" proper names, like 'Bill Clinton' and 'Santa Claus.' The letters show Russell toying with ideas about 'denoting' that are very different from what emerged in his celebrated paper 'On Denoting'. Philosophical Inquiry 41 (1):98-110 (2017) 41 (1):98-110 (2017) Of logically proper names Russell says or implies the follon-ing things : (1) That they and they alone can occur as subjects of sentences which are genuinely of the subject-predic, at e f orm : (2) that an expression intended to be a logically proper name is meaningless unless there is … This article further argues that Russell's solution requires him to adopt certain substantive views about the nature of the referents of what are usually called logically proper names. Russell vs. Frege on Definite Descriptions as Singular Terms1 ... A logically perfect language ... satisfy the conditions, that every expression grammatically well constructed as a proper name out of signs already introduced shall in fact bezeichne an object, and that no new sign shall be introduced as a proper name without being secured a For reasons connected with his doctrine of acquaintance, he On this view, the sentence “Venus is the morning star” is logically equivalent to … expression in which it occurs is meaningless. Ballentine's law dictionary. Russell defines the class of denoting phrases as follows: “By ‘denoting phrase’ I mean a phrase such as any one of the following: a man, some man, any man, every man, all men, the present king of England, the centre of mass of the Solar System at the first instant of the twentieth century, the revolution of the earth around the sun, the revolution of the sun … The word 'Scott' is used as an example of logically proper name here; if it is simple, its meaning cannot be worked out by knowing the meanings of its parts. ... the referring expressions that do contribute individual items to propositions and so have these as their meanings logically proper names; these alone can serve as the subjects of sentences that are truly of S/P form. In particular, Russell's solution will work only if the referents of such nantes are given to one who understands them in a manner that is entirely aspect-free. According to Russell, when we use a description, ‘the F’, in a sentence like so: The F is G, we are actually making three distinct claims. Indeed, this way of reducing general reference to the singular reference of logically proper names, or It is to be noted that Russell's view of the meaning of a logically proper name is strikingly similar to the Old Nyaya's view that the meaning of a proper name is the referent itself, that is, the individual apart from its qualities. Russell's approach is somewhat different. First of all, Russell makes an important distinction between what he calls "ordinary" proper names and "logically" proper names. Logically proper names are indexicals such as this and that, which directly refer (in a Millian sense) to sense-data or other objects of immediate acquaintance. The only genuinely referring expressions (“logically proper names”), by Russell’s principles, are ‘this’, ‘that’ and ‘I’. We should not ask for the meaning of a definite de-scription or a name taken in isolation, because it … One natural theory of semantic content is the naive theory, whose main theses are: (i) the semantic content of any singular term, as used in particular context, is its referent (bearer; the individual referred to); (ii) any semantically contentful expression refers to its semantic content; and (iii) the proposition semantically contained in a sentence is a complex, structured entity whose constituents are the semantic contents of expressions making up the sentence, typically the simple (noncompound) component expre… But the logical form of a sentence containing a definite description is Bertrand Russell, Logic and Knowledge, 1988 The descriptive theory of proper names is the view that the meaning of a given use of a proper name is a set of properties that can be expressed as a description that picks out an object that satisfies the description. Particulars are the thing to which simple symbols refer. This book surveys Russell's writing on language, from the theory of descriptions in "On Denoting" (1905) to An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (1940) and on to his work in the 1950s. Russell and Strawson on Describing and Referring. The Syntax of Proper Names. Where proper names are concerned, both Frege and Russell are often described together as "descriptivists." But their views are fundamentally different. To see that, let's look at the puzzle of names without bearers, as it arises in the context of Mill's purely referential theory of proper names, aka the 'Fido'-Fido theory. Curiously, Russell omits proper names, but he would count them as denoting phrases. Enrico Cipriani. Yet Russell’s claim that proper names are semantically equivalent to descriptions faces serious objections: for example, that it is hard to find a specific description to which a given name … What about names? Expressions used in the uniquely referring way are never either logically proper names or descriptions, if what is meant by calling them 'descriptions' is that they are to be analysed in accordance with the model provided by Russell's Theory of Descriptions. A name denotes its referent directly, carrying its own existential import; but a description denotes only indirectly and must be regarded in a different way. Russell's solution to these puzzles is to stop treating sentences containing definite descriptions as if the descriptions functioned as proper names. A major difference between the Fregean and the Russellian accounts is that for Frege every referring expression, whether a proper name or a description, has both a meaning and a referent, whereas for Russell proper names have referents but no meanings. proper name’ as Bertrand Russell holds). the individual constants of formal logic, which he regarded as Millian. (2) Rigidity. Independent of any worries about Russell’s epistemological assumptions, common proper names appear to be behave quite differently from definite The simple symbols in propositions which refer to things in reality are logically proper names. believes that Russell’s theory applies, if at all, only to attributive uses (p. 293), and that referential uses of definite descriptions are close to proper names, even to Russell’s “logically proper” names (see p. 282 and Section IX). We are, in effect, claiming: • At least one thing is F; • At most one thing is F; and. 1 Denoting phrases and names. many philosophers think about the meaning of proper names, and some of them can cite the following quotation taken from a footnote Frege’s 1892 article “Uber Sinn und Bedeutung.”¨ 2 In the case of an actual proper name such as ‘Aristotle’ opinions as to the Sinn may differ. As well as founding the logic of relations, developing the theory of logicism, … The focus is on familiar aspects of Russell's philosophy, which have already had a great influence on linguists interested in semantics: Russell's theory of descriptions, his views on proper names and vagueness, … Russell: a definite description functions grammatically in the same way as a proper name: as a denoting phrase that purports to uniquely pick out some item (its denotation). Understanding the meaning of a logially proper name requires being directly acquainted with that particular to which it refers. the Fregean sense (Sinn) of proper names, whereas Russell (who rejected the sense/reference dichotomy) sees them as the real logical analysis of proper names—to Russell, therefore, descriptions operate on names at the level of logical forms, not at the semantic level of the analysis as in the cases of Frege and Searle. The simplest propositions, called “elementary” or “atomic,” are complexes whose structure or logical form is … He contrasted these with "logically proper" names, i.e. 16. His thought here, of which Frege clearly does not approve, is that the objects which bear proper names themselves enter into … Logicism and analysis. As discussed above (see History of analytic philosophy: Bertrand Russell), Russell held that definite descriptions are not genuinely referring expressions, as are logically proper names, and that sentences containing them are logically equivalent to complex general statements containing existential and universal quantifiers. What is a logically proper name according to Russell Does Russell think that from CS CYBER SECU at University of California, Davis This is … • Whatever is F is G. To illustrate, suppose I say, … So Kripke differs from Russell in two respects 1 in using the term names in the from PHIL 436 at University of Hawaii, Manoa § Russell: The referent is the object to which the referring term is connected directly, without a descriptive intermediary. Whenever I use the word ‘proper n ame,’ I mean ordinary proper name (not ‘logical . As in Frege’s system, the basic elements consist of referring expressions, or “logically proper” names, which pick out the simplest parts of states of affairs. Russell held, however, that sentences containing ordinary proper names, like (1) and (2), can differ in cognitive significance. Anderson, W.S.. 1998. The first or Christian name of a person. Introduction In The Philosophy o Logical Atomism, Russell declared that â a [logically f proper] name can just name a particular, or, if it does not, it is not a [logically proper] name at all, it is a noiseâ .â This is the case because the particulars so named are the meanings of … As well as having a range of entities to which it applies, the commonnoun “bachelor” has a meaning; it means man who hasnever been married. Thus, Russell held that ordinary proper names, like ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel Clemens’, are not logically proper names. 38 Am J1st Name § 4. Description Theory - Frege and Russell The meaning of a proper name is given by a definite description The semantic contents of names are identical to the descriptions associated, while their referents are determined to be the object which satisfy these descriptions.
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